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Abstract
Among American adults 20 years and older, 59 percent take 
at least one prescription drug on a regular basis. Unlike most 
branded drugs, which are generally drugs that have a trade 
name and are protected by a patent, off-patent generic drugs 
make up approximately 90 percent of prescriptions annu-
ally filled in the United States; yet in 2017, generic drugs 
made up only 23 percent of total drug costs in the U.S. The 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration has taken the lead in 
encouraging increased competition in the nation's prescrip-
tion drug marketplace, most recently with its release of the 
agency's Drug Competition Action Plan, but also with its 
regulatory guidance and enforcement efforts to eliminate 
“gaming” of the regulatory process by both branded and ge-
neric pharmaceutical manufacturers. Such “gaming” activi-
ties include “pay-for-delay” agreements involving financial 
compensation between branded and generic pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to forestall the emergence into the market 
of generic pharmaceuticals to compete against a formerly  
patent-protected branded drug. A combination of new 
enabling legislation, federal judicial guidance, and agency 
regulatory activities show promise in encouraging increased 
competition in the prescription drug marketplace, with the 
American consumer the ultimate beneficiary of lower health 
care costs and improved overall personal health.
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A recent study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (Kantor, Rehm, Haas, 
Han, & Giovannucci, 2015) found that, among American adults 20 years and older, 59 percent take at 
least one prescription drug on a regular basis. Unlike most branded drugs, which are generally drugs 
that have a trade name and are protected by a patent, off-patent generic drugs (that have the same 
bioequivalent active ingredients as the original patent protected, branded pharmaceutical) make up 
approximately 90 percent of prescriptions annually filled in the United States in 2017 (Association for 
Accessible Medicines, 2018). Furthermore, in 2017, generic drugs made up only 23 percent of total 
drug costs in the United States (Association for Accessible Medicines, 2018), thus providing generally 
low-cost relief for the overwhelming majority of Americans who are presently afflicted with a variety 
of long-term, health-related maladies.
According to data retrieved from the Express Scripts Prescription Price Index (2017), between 
January 1, 2008 and January 2016, the price of branded drugs rose 208 percent to an average price 
per prescription of $307.86; in contrast, the price of generic drugs to U.S. consumers fell $26.27 to 
$114.38 per prescription. Moreover, according to the Association for Accessible Medicines (2018), 
generic drugs saved the U.S. healthcare system $1.65 trillion over the last decade (through 2017), 
with a 2017 annual savings of $265.1 billion. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(2016) reports “that decreases in generic drug prices have partially offset large increases in prices for 
brand drugs” and “that generic drug prices are not an important part of the drug cost problem facing 
the nation.”
Yet, since 2010, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2016) found that prices of 
315 generic drugs had seen extraordinary price increases of “at least 100 percent.” The GAO (2016) 
report also notes that “drugs with extraordinary price increases moderated the overall decline in ge-
neric drug prices” as generic drug prices declined 59 percent from the first quarter of 2010 through 
the second quarter of 2015. Thus, the impact of these extraordinary price increases is mitigated by the 
fact that the vast majority of the drugs that experienced these extraordinary price increases were not 
listed among the 100 most commonly used generic drugs listed under Medicare Part D (the focus of 
this GAO study).
1 |  GENERIC DRUG FEES AND REGULATORY 
REVIEW COSTS
Since 2012, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) Office of Generic Drugs (OGD) has 
benefited from the passage of the Generic Drug User Fee Amendments (GDUFA). The GDUFA helps 
expedite the regulatory review process for generic pharmaceutical manufacturers, and the recently 
enacted FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017 includes the re-authorization of the Generic Drug User Fee 
Amendments for another 5 years (Berndt, Conti, & Murphy, 2018). In addition, industry-paid generic 
drug user fees will total $493 million in fiscal year 2018, up from $299 million in fiscal year 2013, 
the first year FDA collected user fees (Gafney, 2018). Generic user fees account for 7 percent of the 
FDA's annual budget and allow the FDA to hire more review staff and make infrastructure improve-
ments (Gafney, 2018). The GDUFA keeps individual generic drug manufacturers assessments fees as 
low as possible to supplement appropriated funding and provide the FDA with the ability to perform 
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critical program review functions involving manufacturer facilities safety, consumer drug access, and 
transparency in the global pharmaceutical supply chain that would not otherwise occur (Berndt et al., 
2018). However, a common criticism of this Act is that such exorbitant fees charged by the FDA to 
regulate generic drug manufacturers has led to the dramatic increases in generic drug prices cited, for 
example, in the GAO report (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2016).
As part of its review, the GAO interviewed five generic pharmaceutical manufacturers, including 
major manufacturers Mylan, Sandoz, and Teva, as well smaller manufacturers G&W Laboratories, 
and Nephron Pharmaceuticals, to solicit their views on generic drug pricing (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2016). The general response from these manufacturers was that competition 
is the major factor in generic drug pricing, meaning that company drug pricing is dependent on the 
price and availability of the bioequivalent drug of their competitors (U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, 2016). Generally, competition between branded and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers 
provides consumers tremendous savings. For example, when a generic pharmaceutical competitor 
enters the market against a branded pharmaceutical competitor, drug prices drop to 70 to 80 percent of 
the brand-name counterpart, and the generic competitor gains substantial share from the brand-name 
product in a short period (Congressional Budget Office, 1998). Subsequent generic entrants may enter 
at even lower prices—discounted 80 percent or more off the price of the brand-name drug—which, in 
turn, prompts the earlier generic entrants to reduce their prices further (Congressional Budget Office, 
1998).
The GAO also found that generic drug prices could be negatively affected by supply disruptions to 
active pharmaceutical ingredients, production difficulties, consolidation among suppliers and buyers, 
and a backlog of new generic drug applications awaiting FDA review (Government Accountability 
Office, 2016). Nowhere, however, does the GAO mention the “exorbitant fees” assessed by the FDA 
for regulatory review to be a factor in the dramatic price increases listed by the surveyed generic 
drug manufacturers. Previously, the FDA had calculated that based on a reported 3.99 billion re-
tail prescriptions dispensed in the United States in 2010, and with 78 percent of these prescriptions 
filled by generic drugs, the estimated regulatory cost of the GDUFA would be less than 10 cents per 
prescription (Government Accountability Office, 2016). Yet, the FDA also noted that with the adop-
tion of GDUFA user fees, and the associated savings in manufacturer drug development time, the 
total cost of bringing a generic drug to market may decline and result in reduced costs (Government 
Accountability Office, 2016).
2 |  IMPROVED FDA REGULATORY PROCESSING TIMES
The OGD is responsible for ensuring, through a scientific and regulatory process, that Americans 
receive safe, effective, and high-quality generic drugs (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2018a). 
For calendar year 2017, the OGD approved the combined highest number (841) of abbreviated new 
drug applications (ANDAs) drug approvals and tentative approvals (184)—1,027 total generic drug 
approvals—in the history of the generic drug program (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2018c). 
In addition, the OGD issued first approvals for generic versions of such commonly used drugs includ-
ing Strattera, Truvada, Coreg CR, Effient, Renvela, and Vytorin. Furthermore, the OGD published 
178 product-specific guidance documents and 17 general guidance documents for use by industry to 
develop generic drugs (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2018c). Moreover, for ANDAs approved, 
the median approval process time has declined from about 24 months in FY2013 to under 15 months 
for FY2015—a staggering reduction from the 42- to 44-month median approval time prior to passage 
of the GDUFA in 2012 (Sullivan, 2018a).
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This approval time is still not at the level of new drug approvals (NDAs), which are more complex 
and presently take from 6 to10 months to review (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2018b). The 
good news is that under the next iteration of the GDUFA in 2018, the median standard review time 
for generic ANDAs will be 10 months from submission, while priority review will be 8 months from 
submission (Sullivan, 2018a). This projected improvement in agency performance will effectively 
eliminate the “backlog” of new generic drug applications awaiting FDA review. It is also strong 
evidence of the success of user fees in getting many essential generic drugs safely to the American 
consumer.
3 |  THE FDA DRUG COMPETITION ACTION PLAN
However, the generic pharmaceutical industry needs to step up to embrace increased competition, 
too. As RBC Capital Markets noted in a 2016 study (Brennan, 2016), the generic pharmaceuti-
cal industry had only 23 “innovator” drugs, that is, generic drugs that can introduce competition 
against an established off-patent brand, pending at the OGD. Moreover, RBC Capital Markets data 
reveal that the lack of generic competition is not primarily an issue of the OGD's speed in facili-
tating the review of generic drugs to market, but in industry submitting applications that would 
create this competition (Brennan, 2016). The RBC found that there are 125 additional “innovator” 
drugs with no approved generics and no abbreviated new drug approvals submitted to the FDA 
(Brennan, 2016).
The new Trump administration-appointed FDA Commissioner, Scott Gottlieb wasted little time in 
announcing that his agency would change the generic drug approval process with a focus on further 
lowering consumer prices.
No patient should be priced out of the medicines they need, and as an agency dedicated 
to promoting public health, we must do our part to help patients get access to the treat-
ments they require, said Gottlieb. Getting safe and effective generic products to market 
in an efficient way, being risk based in our work and making sure our rules aren't used 
to create obstacles to new competition can help make sure that patients have access to 
more lower-cost options (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2017b).
Under its Drug Competition Action Plan, the FDA (in May 2017) posted (and will continue to re-
fine and update on the Internet) a list of branded drugs that have no listed patents or drug exclusivities 
(granted by the FDA) and for which the agency has yet to approve an ANDA application (U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration, 2017b). The FDA has updated this list in December 2017 (U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, 2018d) and June 2018 (Syrop, 2018). The FDA also intends to expedite the review of any 
generic drug application for a product on this list to ensure that they come to market as soon as possible—
with its intended goal being eight months of submission for approval (reduced from the agency's existing 
10-month benchmark) (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2018d). This FDA goal mirrors language 
appearing in the recently enacted FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017. In addition, the FDA also announced 
that it will change its policy on how it will prioritize its review of generic drug applications, expediting 
the review of generic drug applications until there are three approved generics for a given branded drug 
product (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2018d).
In a June 21, 2017 blog posting, FDA Commissioner Gottlieb noted (U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, 2017a):
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We know that sometimes our regulatory rules might be “gamed” in ways that may delay 
generic drug approvals beyond the time frame the law intended, in order to reduce com-
petition. We are actively looking at ways our rules are being used and, in some cases 
misused. … I want to take steps to address these concerns, to make sure that we are 
facilitating appropriate competition where Congress intended.
Some examples of how such “gaming” goes on include, first, increasing the unavailability of cer-
tain branded products for comparative testing, as branded companies may be deliberately using com-
mercial techniques to block a generic company from getting access to testing samples (U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration, 2017a). This regulatory strategy uses restrictions placed in commercial contracts 
or agreements with to make it difficult for intermediaries in the pharmaceutical supply chain to sell the 
drugs to generic drug developers. Second, in some cases, branded sponsors may use limited distribution 
arrangements, whether the company has voluntarily adopted limited distribution, or the limitations im-
posed as part of a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) as a basis for blocking generic firms 
from accessing the testing samples that they need (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2017a). Third, 
some branded companies may be using the statutory default requirement to have a single shared REMS 
across both the branded and generic versions of a drug (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2017a). This 
is a way to block generic entry, prolonging negotiations with the generic firms over the implementation of 
these single shared systems, and resulting in the generic reaching the consumer marketplace (U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration, 2017a). Gottlieb promises that the FDA will “be looking hard at how best to 
coordinate with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in identifying and publicizing practices that the 
FTC finds to be anti-competitive,” as the FTC is the primary agency responsible for preventing such anti-
competitive business practices (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2017a).
In 2018, the FDA has been active in implementing their Drug Competition Action Plan. For example, 
in January 2018, the FDA released two documents that streamline and improve aspects of the submis-
sion and review of generic drug applications (ANDAs) (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2018c). 
Later, in May 2018, the FDA announced that it was taking significant steps to support complex generic 
drug development and application review; prioritizing the review of certain generic drugs; publishing a 
list of off-patent, off-exclusivity branded drugs; and enhancing the efficiency of certain aspects of the 
submission process for generic drug applications (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2018e).
Later, in July 2018, the FDA announced the release of the agency's Biosimilars Action Plan, an 
important component of the Administration's recently announced Blueprint to Lower Drug Plans 
(U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2018f; 2018g). While less than 2 percent of Americans use 
biologics, they currently represent 40 percent of total spending on prescription drugs (U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration, 2018f). Also in July 2018, the FDA announced the formation of a working 
group focused on developing importation policy options to address access challenges related to certain 
sole-source (i.e., single approved U.S. manufacturer) medicines with limited patient availability, but 
having no blocking patents or drug exclusivities (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2018h). Under 
these circumstances, which often can involve generic medicines, patients can be confronted with a 
drug shortage, and leaving them without access to their needed prescription drugs.
Most recently, in October 2018, the FTC announced that it would be addressing “gaming” tac-
tics employed by branded firms to extend a drug monopoly beyond its patent expiration (U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration, 2018i). Specifically, when branded companies make it difficult for generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to gain access to physical doses of a branded drug, as these manufac-
turers need between 2,000 and 5,000 doses of the branded drug to run FDA required studies to prove 
their generic medicine is the bioequivalent of the branded drug. The use of so-called “citizen peti-
tions” improperly filed by companies under section 505(q) of the U.S. Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act 
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has been criticized as an anticompetitive action to block generic drug approvals, although the record 
shows that they have rarely delayed specific generic drug entry to the market. The FDA will release 
revised draft guidance describing some of the factors the FDA will consider in determining whether 
a petition is submitted with the primary purpose of delaying the approval of a generic drug applica-
tion. Furthermore, the guidance document also outlines the agency's intentions to refer such petitions 
deemed as “delaying” to the FTC for potential prosecution under the antitrust statutes.
4 |  PAY-FOR-DELAY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
Another public policy “gaming” concern involves the so-called “pay-for-delay” agreements (or re-
verse payment settlements) between brand-name pharmaceutical companies and generic pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers to stifle competition from lower-cost generic medicines, usually by negotiating 
a specific entry date by the generic pharmaceutical manufacturer later (months, if not years) than it 
would have been absent any financial compensation (Bloomberg Law, 2017; McCaughan, 2017). 
Consumer advocates and the FTC say these brand-name drug makers have been able to sidestep com-
petition by offering patent settlements to pay generic companies not to bring lower-cost alternatives 
to market.
Such pay-for-delay agreements have arisen in the context of the Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act of 1984 (“Hatch-Waxman Act”) (Bloomberg Law, 2017; McCaughan, 2017). 
The Hatch-Waxman Act created an expedited FDA approval process for a generic drug manufacturer 
to seek market entry prior to the expiration of the brand drug manufacturer's patent. Under the Hatch-
Waxman Act, to initiate this early entry, the generic pharmaceutical company may either (a) contest 
the validity of the patent or (b) argue that its new product does not infringe the brand-name drug's 
patent. If the generic pharmaceutical company is successful on proving its case on either of these 
grounds, the FDA will then approve the generic version for sale to American consumers.
Generic drug makers and brand manufacturers, the parties involved in the settlements, argue that 
“pay-to-delay” agreements have saved American consumers hundreds of billions of dollars. Typically, 
the generic can come to market before the expiration date of at minimum one patent at issue, and the 
certainty of the timing (specified in the agreement) benefits purchasers (McCaughan, 2017). Ralph 
G. Neas, president of the Generic Pharmaceutical Association (now the Association for Accessible 
Medicines), sums up the generic pharmaceutical industry's policy position on reverse settlements 
(Sullivan, 2018a):
The current industry paradigm of challenging patents on branded drugs in order to bring 
new generics to market as soon as possible has produced $1.06 trillion in savings over 
the past 10 years. The facts are clear. Patent settlements save. They are pro-competition, 
pro-consumer, and have saved consumers and taxpayers billions of dollars. 
However, these reverse payment settlements to forestall generic drug market entry have raised FTC 
concerns under the Sherman Antitrust Act, which prohibits inter-company agreements that unreasonably 
interfere with competition in the marketplace (Bloomberg Law, 2017). The FTC estimates that “pay-for-
delay” agreements cost American consumers approximately $3.5 billion annually in increased healthcare 
costs (Federal Trade Commission, 2010). However, these “pay-for-delay” agreements are not without 
controversy within the federal government, as back in 2011 the U.S. Department of Justice could not agree 
with the FTC on whether these arrangements should be challenged (Bloomberg Law, 2017).
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The federal judiciary, at both the district and Supreme Court level, has weighed in on the “pay-for-
delay” issue. In a June 2013 decision, Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled 5–3 that reverse payment settlements between branded and generic pharmaceutical companies 
should be subject to a legal “rule of reason” antitrust standard. The Supreme Court had agreed to hear 
the case after several federal circuit courts had rendered split decisions for and against plaintiffs since 
2001 on which antitrust standard to apply. Consequently, challenges to these patent settlements will 
now require the federal judiciary to weigh the competitive effects of the settlements on a case-by-case 
basis, rather than the more industry-friendly “scope of the patent” test or “presumptively unlawful” 
standard (which is the standard advocated by the FTC). In its decision, the Supreme Court left it to 
the lower federal courts to decide how to apply a rule-of-reason standard. Under this Supreme Court 
precedent, that judicial process has already begun.
In June 2015, the Third Circuit Court ruled 3–0 (in King Drug Co. of Florence et al. 
v. SmithKlineBeecham Corp. et al.) that pharmaceutical patent settlements do not need to be in the 
form of a cash payout from a brand pharmaceutical manufacturer to a generic manufacturer. The Court 
held that such patent settlements could be in the form of other types of business considerations, for 
example, a promise not to manufacture its own generic brand, to be eligible for antitrust scrutiny as a 
pay-for-delay agreement.
“We believe that this no-AG [authorized generic] agreement falls under Actavia' rule 
because it may represent an unusual, unexplained reverse transfer of considerable value 
from the patentee to the alleged infringer and may therefore give rise to the inference that 
it is a payment to eliminate the risk of competition,” wrote U.S. Circuit Judge Anthony 
J. Scirica for the panel. As the [Supreme] Court noted, these kinds of settlements are 
subject to the rule of reason.
The U.S. Supreme Court announced it would rule early in 2019 on whether a “pay-to-delay agreement 
between Abbott Laboratories' Solvay Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Watson Pharmaceuticals (along with two 
similar cases), a generic manufacturer, could be challenged under the Sherman Act (Sullivan, 2018b). 
The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta held that the pay-for-delay agreement over AndroGel did 
not constitute an illegal restraint of trade. This was the third time since 2003 that a federal circuit court 
has upheld such agreements (Sullivan, 2018b). The FTC alleges that Solvay entered into anticompetitive 
patent settlements (ranging from $31 million to $42 million annually) with Watson and generic drug 
manufacturers Par Pharmaceuticals Cos. and Paddock Holdings Inc. to delay the introduction of a generic 
competitor to Solvay's testosterone replacement drug AndroGel (Sullivan, 2018b). The Supreme Court's 
holding on this case (and similar cases) should provide needed clarification into which “pay-to-delay” 
agreements are worth pursuing by the agency.
5 |  FTC MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT
The FTC has monitored the generic pharmaceutical marketplace for over a decade (FY2004) and has 
been compiling and analyzing data on reverse payment settlements, with the highest number—40 
potentially problematic “pay-for-delay” agreements—out of 140 reported settlements reported in 
FY2012 (Federal Trade Commission, 2016). The number (of potentially problematic agreements) 
dropped to 29 for FY2013, the year of the Supreme Court Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis 
decision, although the total number of settlements rose to 145 (Federal Trade Commission, 2016). 
For FY2014, the latest report issued by the agency (and year after the Federal Trade Commission 
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v. Actavis decision, the FTC revealed that there were 21 potentially problematic reverse payment set-
tlements out of 160, a nearly 50 percent reduction from FY2012 (Federal Trade Commission, 2016).
The FTC also reported that the so-called “AG agreements,” in which brand drug manufacturers 
promised not to sell a competing authorized generic (AG) version of their branded drug, had fallen 
from 19 in FY2012, to four in FY2013 and five in FY2014 (Noonan, 2016). For FY2014, the FTC 
report noted that over 80 percent (either 81 or 87 percent, based on two data sample populations) of the 
patent disputes were resolved without any financial compensation from the brand manufacturer to the 
generic manufacturer and/or without restrictions on generic competition (Federal Trade Commission, 
2016).
Meanwhile, historically, the FTC has vigorously pursued antitrust litigation for nearly two decades 
against branded pharmaceutical manufacturers who use pay-for-delay agreements with generic phar-
maceutical companies, challenging these agreements as illegally stifling competition and maintaining 
economically (and legally) unjustified monopolies. This agency involvement goes back to 1997, when 
a federal court ruled in Mova v. Shala that the FTC's policy contradicted the reading of the Hatch-
Waxman Act of 1984 regarding the 6-month exclusivity awarded to the first applicant to file an ANDA 
(McCaughan, 2017). Since 2000, the FTC has brought several antitrust cases challenging settlements 
that involved reverse payments (McCaughan, 2017).
The agency has had some successes, including its 2015 “pay-for-delay” $1.2 billion settlement 
(an activity encouraged by the federal district courts) with pharmaceutical manufacturers Cephalon, 
and Teva, the FTC has continued to be actively involved in several “pay-for-delay” cases (Bloomberg 
Law, 2017; McCaughan, 2017). Yet, there are also failures. In May 2018, an administrative law judge 
dismissed an FTC “pay-to-delay” agreement complaint against generic pharmaceutical company 
Impax Laboratories, Inc. and brand manufacturer Endo Pharmaceuticals (Federal Trade Commission, 
2018). The administrative law judge concluded that the FTC failed (under a rule-of-reason analysis) to 
prove that the agreement between the defendants violated section 5 if the Federal Trade Commission 
Act (Federal Trade Commission, 2018). The FTC counsel has filed an appeal for a review by the 
Commission members (Federal Trade Commission, 2018).
The FTC notes that potentially problematic “pay-for-delay” agreements between branded and ge-
neric companies may be declining, but they are still prevalent in the pharmaceutical marketplace 
(Federal Trade Commission, 2016). “When drug companies agree not to compete, consumers lose,” 
said former FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz (Sullivan, 2018b). In calendar year 2017, the agency re-
ported that 28 “pay-for-delay” agreements reached in the pharmaceutical industry, with another 127 
such business arrangements made between 2005 and 2011 (Sullivan, 2018b). Since the Supreme Court 
decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, however, attorneys working in the pharmaceutical 
industry observe that litigation is waning as pharmaceutical companies are turning away from consid-
ering reverse payment settlements and are contemplating the impact of circuit court rulings against 
these types of agreements (Kroh, 2017).
6 |  POLICY SOLUTIONS
The recently announced FDA Drug Competition Action Plan is well underway, and is an important 
policy focus of the Trump administration, and a reasonable regulatory period for generic drug approv-
als is definitely in the offing. While the Drug Competition Action Plan is one of the FDA's highest 
priorities in 2018 and beyond, the responsibility for improving price competition rests with a pharma-
ceutical industry willing to commit its financial resources to manufacturing an array of bioequivalent 
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pharmaceuticals against branded, off-patent products, and not actively engaging in reverse settlement 
agreements and other forms of “gaming” activities.
Since the 2013 Supreme Court decision, there has been a significant decrease in what the FTC 
terms “potentially problematic” pay-to-delay agreements initiated by branded pharmaceutical com-
panies—although an insufficient time to seriously label it a consistent trend until further data are col-
lected by the agency from FY 2015 onward. The FTC should focus its agency resources on continuing 
to assiduously monitor the pharmaceutical industry for such reverse settlement agreements that will 
not pass muster under the rule of reason antitrust standard, and intervene with litigation when neces-
sary. Moreover, further guidance on how to apply this rule of reason standard will develop from future 
decisions made in the federal circuit courts and the U.S. Supreme Court.
In the 115th Congress, U.S. Senators Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) and Charles Grassley (R-IA) jointly 
introduced a bill (S.124), the “Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act,” which would essentially 
make illegal reverse payment agreements among drug companies. The bill is similar to legislation 
sponsored by Klobuchar and Grassley in the 114th Congress. “Outrageous pay-for-delay deals thwart 
competition and raise prescription drug prices for consumers,” said Klobuchar. “This bill would pre-
vent drug companies from engaging in these abusive dealings and ensures more timely access to 
affordable medicines,” Grassley added. Bill S.124 is presently in the U.S. Senate's Committee on the 
Judiciary.
The purpose of the Act is twofold: (a) enhance competition in the pharmaceutical market by stop-
ping anticompetitive agreements between brand-name and generic drug manufacturers that limit, 
delay, or otherwise prevent competition from generic drugs; and (b) support the purpose and intent 
of antitrust law by prohibiting anticompetitive practices in the pharmaceutical industry that harm 
consumers. It is noteworthy that the FTC has been a consistent supporter of passage of Congressional 
legislation ending all forms of pay-for-delay agreements.
The proposed legislation, however, contains one notable exception that may placate the pharma-
ceutical industry (Sullivan, 2018c): “If the parties to such agreement demonstrate by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the procompetitive benefits of the agreement outweigh the anti-competitive 
effects of the agreement.” This provision could keep the pay-for-delay practice alive, although its pro-
ponents would need to present compelling evidence of its benefits to the consumer (Sullivan, 2018c). 
This evidence includes the value to consumers, the form and amount of compensation, revenues under 
various scenarios, the time it takes for the generic to reach market under various scenarios, and any 
other information deemed to be relevant (Sullivan, 2018c). The burden of proof, however, falls upon 
the parties interested in entering into a reverse payments settlement.
Whether there is legitimate need for passage of S.124 (or its successor in the 116th Congress) may 
be partially answered by the FTC updating its review of “pay-for-delay” agreements in the pharma-
ceutical marketplace for more recent fiscal years. The direction of this data will give an indication of 
whether the rule of reason standard, in conjunction with further clarification by the federal judiciary, 
is positively influencing a further decline in what the FTC terms “potentially problematic reverse 
payment agreements” in the generic pharmaceutical marketplace.
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